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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the federal presumption against 
extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.1 and Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2 has had an unexpected consequence. In many 
circumstances, state law may apply abroad far more broadly than does federal 
law.3 Thus, even as the Supreme Court has significantly scaled back the reach of 
federal law abroad, advocates and litigators have awakened to the potential use of 
state law to obtain relief in disputes occurring partially or largely outside U.S. 
borders.4 
 
* Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. I would like to thank Anupam Chander, William S. 
Dodge, Franklin Gevurtz, John Patrick Hunt, and Courtney Joslin for comments on this Article. 
1. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010). 
2. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
3. See Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the 
Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 255 (2011). 
4. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational 
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012); see Kirby, supra note 3, at 150; See generally, e.g., Christopher A. 
Whytock et al., After Kiobel–International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013); see generally Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS and 
the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-
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To be sure, personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens continue to 
present obstacles for litigants wishing to adjudicate primarily foreign 
controversies.5 But those who surmount these procedural hurdles are likely to 
find that, at the choice-of-law stage, many state courts readily apply their own 
law or the law of a different U.S. state to disputes with foreign elements.6 
Although choice-of-law methodologies vary from state to state, many states have 
explicit preferences for forum law in close cases,7 and in many other 
circumstances, conflicts principles may dictate the application of state law even 
where a substantial percentage of the events involved occurred abroad.8 Further, 
state courts rarely address the problem of extraterritoriality explicitly, and state 
choice-of-law principles in general do not differentiate between sister-state and 
foreign-nation law.9 These factors, in combination, make it likely that cases will 
frequently arise in which courts apply state law to overseas litigants and conduct; 
indeed, in many cases (most of which have attracted little fanfare), they have 
already done so.10 
Thus, in the wake of Morrison and Kiobel, it appears that state law may have 
greater extraterritorial application than federal law.11 This result is surely not 
what anyone would have intended, much less desired. State law applied abroad 
indiscriminately raises concerns similar to those present when federal law is 
applied too broadly to foreign disputes.12 The use of state law in this manner has, 
for example, the potential to be seen as an inappropriate projection of U.S. 
power13 and to send unclear signals to those who must shape their primary 
 
the-rise-of-transnational-tort-litigation/ (last visited July 17, 2013); see generally Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, 
Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights 
Claims, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 
537 (2012) (noting that plaintiffs adjudicating claims arising abroad in U.S. courts “will face challenges—most 
notably, establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendants and avoiding a forum non 
conveniens dismissal”). 
6. Id. at 537-38. 
7. See id. (“[I]n many state choice-of-law systems, bias toward the application of forum law is 
common.”). 
8. See, e.g., the examples given in Part III. 
9. See Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement—for the International Age, 75 IND. L.J. 575, 576-77 (2000) 
(explaining that the influential Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws treats foreign law and state law more 
or less identically). 
10. See generally Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, (2010); see generally Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
11. Florey, supra note 5, at 537. 
12. Id. at 540. 
13. See id. at 571 (“When state law applies to conduct abroad, it is no less an application of U.S. law than 
when federal law is applied.”); see also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. Civ.A.01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL 
516744, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006) (describing the law of individual states as “U.S. state law” and finding 
that the “interest of the United States” outweighed “Indonesia’s interest in applying its own law” in the case at 
hand). 
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conduct to conform to the law.14 Moreover, extraterritorial application of state 
law raises issues of unpredictability and lack of uniformity that are present to an 
even greater extent than when federal law is involved, given the differences 
among states both in their decisional rules and their choice-of-law 
methodologies. Because of this, to the extent that U.S. law is to be applied 
abroad, sound reasons exist for such law to be predominantly federal.15 
Existing state choice-of-law doctrine, however, slights such considerations.16 
From the state perspective, state courts have little doctrinal guidance in how to 
navigate the special issues that are present when an otherwise routine conflicts 
problem involves foreign rather than sister-state law.17 At the same time, the 
federal presumption against extraterritoriality (which has increasingly become 
the standard methodology for interpreting the reach of federal law) leaves little or 
no room for taking into account the possibility that state law may apply where 
federal law does not.18 
This Article thus argues that, even as state-law and federal-law approaches 
regarding extraterritoriality have been growing farther apart, a strong case can be 
made for greater convergence. Ideally, this convergence should come from both 
directions. On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been criticized (among other grounds) for resting on an 
overly narrow and formalistic view of both congressional intent and of the proper 
territorial scope of law.19 Many of these criticisms are just, and the likely 
substitution of state law for federal law in similar cases provides an additional 
argument against expansion of the presumption. 
At the same time, the choice-of-law principles applied by state courts suffer 
from an unjustifiable provinciality. The battles of the mid-twentieth century 
choice-of-law “revolution”—which occurred at a time when the main task of 
conflicts principles was to navigate minor differences between states—continue 
to drive conflicts doctrine today in a way that constrains choice-of-law 
development.20 It is time for state courts to begin considering the international 
 
14. Those who engage in conduct abroad, in other words, may have little way of ascertaining which legal 
standards should govern their behavior. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 73 
(2012) (arguing that “if the state had no prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct when the defendant engaged 
in it . . . the defendant could not reasonably have expected the state’s law to apply at the time of conduct,” thus 
creating potential due process problems). 
15. See Florey, supra note 5, at 568-70 (discussing potential problems when federal law is supplanted by 
state law abroad). 
16. Id. at 569. 
17. See id.  
18. Id. at 552.  
19. For critical views of the presumption in general and Morrison in particular, see generally, e.g., 
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the 
U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (2011); see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to 
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011); see generally John H. Knox, A Presumption Against 
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 (2010). 
20. Knox, supra note 19, at 361-62. 
02_FLOREY_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:50 PM 
2014 / Bridging the Divide 
200 
context and taking extraterritoriality concerns seriously in cases involving 
foreign elements. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Section II, it briefly sketches the 
history of the presumption against extraterritoriality and the Court’s recent 
expansion of the scope of that doctrine in Morrison and Kiobel.21 Section III 
discusses the contrasting picture presented by the application of state choice-of-
law to cases involving foreign elements.22 In Section IV, the Article then 
considers the example of California—a large state with courts that hear many 
cases with foreign elements—by examining cases in which California choice-of-
law methodology has dictated the application of California substantive rules to 
conduct abroad.23 Finally in Section V, the Article briefly makes the case for 
bringing federal and state extraterritoriality approaches into greater harmony, and 
outlines ways in which that aim might be accomplished.24 
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND FEDERAL LAW 
The Supreme Court has always recognized that some presumptive limits 
exist on the degree to which federal law should apply abroad.25 These limits are 
not imposed by the Constitution, which does not clearly speak to the issue,26 but 
by other principles. One such principle, rooted in international norms, was first 
described by the Court in 1804.27 In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,28 the 
Court found that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains”29 establishing, as John 
H. Knox has put it, “a presumption that federal law does not extend beyond the 
jurisdictional limits set by international law.”30 
Charming Betsy, however, was not the last word on the matter.31 Subsequent 
cases, such as the Court’s famous 1909 opinion in American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co.,32 took a more narrowly territorial view of U.S. power, 
suggesting that federal law would be presumed to apply only within the territory 
 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. See infra Part IV. 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. Knox, supra note 19, at 361. 
26. See id. at 351 (“Congress could not, of course, exceed constitutional limits [on enacting 
extraterritorial legislation], but the Supreme Court has never clarified such limits, if they exist.”). 
27. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64, 118 (1804). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See Knox, supra note 19, at 352 (describing this principle as an “offshoot of the Charming Betsy 
canon”). 
31. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
32. See generally id. 
02_FLOREY_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:50 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
201 
of the United States.33 Later lower-court cases relaxed this standard and allowed 
for broader application of U.S. law abroad where, for example, foreign conduct 
had effects within the United States effects.34 
In a handful of cases, however, the Court applied the presumption, rooted in 
American Banana Co.’s reasoning, that “legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States,”35 or what is now referred to as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.36 Initially, the presumption applied in a narrow range of cases 
and imposed a rather modest hurdle.37 In the past twenty years, however, the 
Court has applied the presumption far more widely and strictly. In Aramco,38 
which launched this recent expansion, the Court relied on the presumption to 
hold that Congress did not intend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
govern the actions of U.S. employers who employed American citizens abroad.39 
While the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in some 
post-Aramco cases,40 elsewhere it allowed for a more expansive application of 
U.S. law abroad.41 But in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court 
seemed to bring an end to the more expansive view, suggesting that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality should become the dominant framework 
for assessing the applicability of federal law abroad.42 In Morrison, a class of 
foreign investors sought to sue Australia’s largest bank, National Australia Bank, 
for violations of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.43 The case 
arose out of National’s purchase of HomeSide Lending, a Florida-based 
 
33. See id. at 357 (describing principle of adopting “in case of doubt . . . a construction of any statute as 
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general 
and legitimate power”). 
34. See Florey, supra note 5, at 541 (noting that courts began increasingly to embrace a principle that 
U.S. law applied abroad to the extent consistent with international jurisdictional norms). 
35. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See Knox, supra note 19, at 366-74 (describing early evolution of the presumption). 
36. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
37. See Knox, supra note 19, at 371; see Aramco, 499 U.S. at 271; see Florey, supra note 5, at 541 
(describing Court’s initial formulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality having a “limited scope” 
and requiring a “lower standard” to overcome than the Charming Betsy/extra jurisdictionality presumption). 
38. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246-47. 
39. Id. Congress quickly reversed this result legislatively. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1, 12111-12). 
40. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1993); see Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 
197, 204 (1993) (finding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to a 
claim arising in Antarctica); see also Knox, supra note 19, at 375-76. 
41. Most notably, in Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993), the Court held that the 
Sherman Act applied to extraterritorial conduct that was intended to produce and did produce “some substantial 
effect” in the United States. The majority did not mention the presumption against extraterritoriality; in dissent, 
Justice Scalia discussed the presumption but found that it had been overcome because of “well established” case 
law interpreting the Sherman Act. Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). 
43. Id. at 2875-76. 
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mortgage servicer;44 plaintiffs alleged that National had made fraudulent 
representations about HomeSide’s value.45 
The Second Circuit had dismissed the action on the basis of its venerable test 
holding that Section 10(b) could be applied only when the wrongful conduct at 
issue either “had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States 
citizens” or “occurred in the United States.”46 Neither of these tests, the Second 
Circuit had found, was satisfied in this case.47 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal, but on an entirely different ground—the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.48 In doing so, the Court referred to the presumption as a 
“longstanding principle of American law”49 and criticized the Second Circuit for 
failing to rely on it in earlier securities cases.50 Notably, Morrison made clear that 
the presumption was a matter of presumed congressional intent, a “canon of 
construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate,” and that 
it could be overcome by “the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect.”51 
Morrison had both obvious and subtler consequences.52 Most obviously, 
Morrison significantly scaled back the reach of federal securities law.53 More 
broadly, by suggesting that it was error54 not to apply the presumption in the 
securities context (where long-standing case law had applied more liberal tests), 
Morrison suggested an expanded and entrenched role for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.55 And indeed, taking their cues from the Court, lower courts in 
the wake of the decision applied Morrison to find that other federal statutes, such 
as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), did not 
apply abroad because the presumption had not been overcome.56 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 2876. 
46. See id. at 2879 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
47. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
48. Invoking the presumption, the Court formulated a different test of Section 10(b)’s territorial reach, 
finding that Section 10(b) applied only to cases when a “purchase or sale is made in the United States, or 
involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.” Id. at 2886. 
49. Id. at 2877 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
50. Id. at 2878. 
51. Id. at 2877 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
52. See generally id. 
53. See Beyea, supra note 19, at 540 (noting that Morrison “mak[es] the private cause of action 
unavailable in most securities fraud cases with a significant overseas component”). 
54. The Court, that is, criticized the Second Circuit for not applying the presumption, which it described 
as a “principle of interpretation . . . long and often recited in our opinions.” See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. 
55. Id. at 2881. 
56. See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 31-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (presumption 
against extraterritoriality barred suit by Cypriot company against New York-based defendants alleging various 
fraudulent machinations in wresting control of a Russian oil company). 
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Any lingering uncertainty about the central place of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the Court’s interpretive framework was dispelled by the 
Court’s 9-0 decision in the 2013 case Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.57 In 
Kiobel, several Nigerian nationals living in the United States sued various 
“Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations . . . under the Alien Tort Statute” 
(ATS), alleging that the defendants “aided and abetted the Nigerian Government 
in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria”58 by providing food, 
transportation, and money to Nigerian military forces who had beaten, raped, and 
killed anti-oil protesters.59 In an earlier case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,60 the Court 
had held that the ATS, in addition to granting federal district courts jurisdiction 
over certain claims,61 had also “been enacted on the understanding that the 
common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of 
international law violations.”62 Thus, the question before the Court in Kiobel was 
“not whether petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a 
claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”63 
Analysis of this issue, the Court concluded, was “constrain[ed]” by the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.64 Further, the Court found, the 
presumption could not be overcome in this case.65 Reviewing evidence 
contemporary to the ATS’s enactment, the Court found that it “provide[d] no 
support for the proposition that Congress expected causes of action to be brought 
under the statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad.”66 
Kiobel is significant not only for cementing the Court’s reliance on the 
presumption, but for the narrow view it took of the notion of “territory” itself.67 
Kiobel itself concerned events that had clearly occurred outside U.S. territory—
the alleged conduct at issue concerned events in Nigeria and had presumably 
occurred either there or in the corporations’ home countries.68 Yet Kiobel also 
offered some speculation about what conduct might be sufficiently tied to the 
United States to become subject to the ATS’s reach.69 The Court noted that “even 
where . . . claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must 
do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
 
57. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1662-63. 
60. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
61. Id. at 739. 
62. Id. at 724. 
63. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
64. Id. at 1665. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1666. 
67. Id. at 1669. 
68. Id. (“On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”). 
69. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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application.”70 Justice Robert’s use of the term “touch and concern” is striking 
here, suggesting a literal, physical view of territory that is one not of a sovereign 
but of a landowner.71 As the following section will discuss, this literal 
understanding of territory is quite alien to the state choice-of-law context, which 
focuses on state interests rather than a literal view of state power’s territorial 
reach.72 
Kiobel may be said to divorce further the presumption against 
extraterritoriality from an analysis that focuses on international norms or broader 
jurisdictional questions. As the following section will discuss, this widens the 
gap between federal and state approaches in both a practical way and a doctrinal 
one.
73
 From a practical perspective, the strictness of the presumption, in contrast 
to the relative liberality of many state approaches, means that in many cases with 
foreign elements, state law will apply where federal law does not.74 Doctrinally, 
the presumption focuses narrowly on legislative intent and on an old-fashioned 
and formalistic view of territory,75 neither of which is of much use to state courts, 
which deal substantially in judge-made law and cannot escape the reality of cases 
with complex multijurisdictional contacts. 
III. STATE CONFLICTS PRINCIPLES AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
In contrast to the federal context, the law of extraterritoriality in most states 
is strikingly underdeveloped. In state courts, concerns that fall under the rubric of 
extraterritoriality in the federal context are typically addressed through the 
normal state choice-of-law process.76 For the most part, that process lacks a 
mechanism for taking into account extraterritoriality concerns.77 
In some ways, it is difficult to generalize about state choice-of-law 
approaches. As a result of the mid-twentieth century choice-of-law “revolution,” 
state choice-of-law methodologies are extremely diverse.78 A handful of states 
adhere to traditional territorial approaches that require courts to look to a single 
localizing factor, such as the place of injury in a tort case.79 Many states use some 
form of governmental interest analysis, which looks to the degree to which 
applying a particular decisional rule will further the policies motivating that 
 
70. Id.  
71. Id. 
72. See infra Part III. 
73. See infra Part III. 
74. Florey, supra note 5, at 538.  
75. Id. at 542. 
76. Id. at 537. 
77. Id. at 560. 
78. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 278 (2013) (presenting table summarizing state approaches). 
79. See id. 
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rule.80 The largest group of states follows the approach of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, a multifactor framework that incorporates a bit of 
each of these methods.81 For all their differences, however, many choice-of-law 
systems have common features: a preference for forum law,82 some consideration 
of whether any potentially involved jurisdiction has an “interest” in the dispute,83 
and a general policy of flexibility that necessarily entails some judicial 
discretion.84 
Further, state choice-of-law methodologies almost universally treat other-
state and non-U.S. law identically.85 As one commenter has observed, for 
example, under the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, “it does not matter 
whether the choice is between the law of New York and New Hampshire or 
between the law of New York and New Guinea.”86 The same tends to be true of 
other methods.87 Indeed, many of the foundational cases of the choice-of-law 
revolution dealt with conflicts between the law of a U.S. state and that of a 
Canadian province, with little or no consideration of how the international 
dimension might shape the issues involved.88 
From a historical perspective, states’ lack of focus on extraterritoriality 
concerns is understandable.89 Modern choice-of-law doctrines evolved primarily 
to deal with relatively minor conflicts with sister states (or Canadian provinces) 
such as guest statutes and inter-spousal immunity.90 Their architects were 
concerned with avoiding arbitrariness, manipulation, and unpredictable results—
not with navigating clashes of values between jurisdictions.91 Thus, state conflicts 
principles were never developed with an eye to navigating the more serious 
 
80. See id. at 278-80. One version of governmental interest analysis is California’s comparative 
impairment methodology. See infra Part IV. 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). In addition to the choice-of-law 
theories discussed, a handful of states follow their own idiosyncratic methods. See Florey, supra note 5, at 556. 
82. See Florey, supra note 5, at 553. 
83. See id. at 555. 
84. See id. at 539, 554-58 (summarizing some common features of most state choice-of-law regimes). 
85. Id. at 537. 
86. Id. at 560. 
87. See infra Part IV (discussing various California cases). 
88. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). One of the earliest cases to abandon the 
traditional First Restatement choice-of-law methodology, involved a conflict between the law of New York and 
the law of Ontario. The majority found that New York law should apply despite the fact that the case arose out 
of an accident in Ontario. Id. at 284-85. Interestingly, the dissent criticized the majority for resorting to “a form 
of extraterritoriality.” See id. at 286-87 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). 
89. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Symposium: Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues in 
Mass Tort Litigation: Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105 (1989). 
90. One scholar, for example, has criticized conflicts doctrine as excessively concerned with such 
“humdrum mishaps as a collision on an interstate highway.” See id. at 105. 
91. See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone 
Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1136-37 (2010).  
02_FLOREY_MASTER_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2015 12:50 PM 
2014 / Bridging the Divide 
206 
differences on regulatory policy and other issues that may attend disputes with 
foreign elements.92 
Perhaps an even more difficult problem, however, is that much state law 
remains common law. To the extent that federal extraterritoriality doctrines have 
focused on legislative intent, they provide little guidance to state courts in such 
cases.
93
 For this reason, federal cases applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality are arguably less helpful to state courts than earlier cases that 
focused on questions of comity94 and extrajurisdictionality (that is, assertions of 
U.S. law in violation of international norms)95 in ascertaining the proper reach of 
federal law abroad. State courts generally have not relied on federal case law in 
deciding conflicts cases,96 but the principles such cases articulated held at least 
the potential to be transferrable to scenarios that state courts confront.97 By 
 
92. See generally id. 
93. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1993) (suggesting that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality caused the Court to arrive at the “same conclusion that the 79th Congress would have 
reached had it expressly considered the question we now decide”). Earlier anti-extrajurisdictionality doctrines 
likewise focused on legislative intent in the sense that they could be overcome by a clear statement of 
Congress’s wishes. See Knox, supra note 19, at 361. 
94. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane 
Lumber Co. was widely influential in announcing a number of comity-based factors (which came to be called 
the “Timberlane factors”) that courts should consider in determining whether a federal statute (the Sherman 
Act) should be applied abroad. Id. Among the factors the Ninth Circuit considered were:  
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the 
locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either 
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States 
as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect 
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations 
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 
Id. at 614. The Supreme Court, however, has diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s framework. While not explicitly 
overruling Timberlane Lumber Co., the Court took a strikingly different approach in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that comity factors need not come into play so long as foreign 
conduct produced a “substantial effect” in the United States). And “a person subject to regulation by two states 
[could] comply with the laws of both.” Id. at 799 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
95. See Knox, supra note 19, at 360-61 (advocating canon of interpreting the extraterritorial reach of 
statutes based on “international limits of jurisdiction,” and citing case law taking this approach); id. at 362-66 
(discussing early case law applying a presumption against extrajurisdictionality). 
96. For example, as of August 2013, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Timberlane Lumber Co. had been 
cited in nearly 200 opinions available on Westlaw, but only once by a state court, and not by that court for any 
comity-related proposition. See UFJ Bank Ltd. v. Ieda, 123 P.3d 1232, 1239 (Haw. 2005) (citing Timberlane 
Lumber for the proposition that forum non conveniens may apply only when venue is proper).  
97. For example, the comity-based Timberlane factors focus on the practical effect and foreign-relations 
consequences of applying American law abroad, not on legislative intent. See Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 
91, at 1136-37. Interestingly, Hannah Buxbaum has pointed out that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law, which sought to take an international rather than purely domestic perspective on the subject of 
extraterritorial regulation, was influenced by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, suggesting a 
potential avenue for mutual influence between state and federal extraterritoriality approaches. See Hannah L. 
Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 649 
(2009). The Third Restatement, however, has generally been seen as “simply aspirational,” failing to “reflect 
U.S. understanding or practice regarding the limits of legislative jurisdiction.” See id. 
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contrast, the current articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality has 
far more limited relevance to state courts.98 
To be sure, cases like Aramco and Morrison have not completely lacked 
influence in state courts.99 In rare cases, some state courts have borrowed from 
federal extraterritoriality cases in interpreting the reach of state statutes outside 
state borders.100 This borrowing, however, has obvious limits. First, a 
presumption against extraterritoriality, insofar as it is modeled on the federal one, 
can only be applied to state statutory law; courts thus have little guidance in more 
routine choice-of-law situations involving the applicability of state common 
law.101 Second, many of the state decisions that look to federal doctrine deal with 
state statutes that closely map federal ones, to which the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has already been applied.102 In many cases in which more state-
specific statutes are at issue, state courts tend to analyze them through ordinary 
choice-of-law methods without recourse to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.103 
In sum, traditional state conflicts principles do little to constrain the 
extraterritorial application of state law. Further, although the Supreme Court has 
 
98. Arguably, Kiobel bridges the divide to some degree in the sense that the Alien Tort Statute, which it 
interprets, is a jurisdictional statute; substantive causes of action under the statute must be based on common 
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting federal district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). The Court in 
Kiobel thus worried about the foreign policy consequences that might ensue when “a cause of action under the 
ATS reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign.” See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013). At the same time, in considering whether the presumption had been overcome, the Court 
focused exclusively on the statutory “text, history, and purposes” of the ATS, not on more general comity or 
foreign-policy concerns. Id. 
99. See, e.g., Abel v. Planning and Zoning Comm’n of New Canaan, 998 A.2d 1149, 1154-55 (Conn. 
2010).  
100. Richard D. Bernstein et al., Closing Time: You Don’t Have to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here, 
67 BUS. LAW. 957, 969 (2012) (noting that “many state courts apply a similar test to Morrison to presume that 
state statutes do not apply extraterritorially”). To some extent, this trend pre-dated Morrison. See Abel, 998 
A.2d at 1154-55 (noting that “[m]any state courts have applied this principle [the presumption against 
extraterritoriality] to state statutes” and citing several cases to do so). 
101. Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969. 
102. Thus, for example, courts interpreting state employment discrimination standards appear particularly 
likely to apply the Court’s opinion in Aramco. See, e.g., Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 
190-92 (Ky. 2001) (relying on part on Aramco to find that Kentucky state anti-discrimination statute did not 
apply to conduct outside Kentucky); see, e.g., Judkins v. Saint Joseph’s College of Maine, 483 F. Supp. 2d 60, 
65-66 (D. Me. 2007) (reaching similar result with respect to similar Maine law); see, e.g., Blackman v. Lincoln 
Nat’l Corp., No. 10-6946, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175021, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2012) (same with respect 
to Pennsylvania law). Note that “extraterritorial” in this context has generally referred to the operation of state 
statutes outside state territory (i.e., in sister states) rather than outside the United States. Similarly, state courts 
interpreting state RICO statutes have followed federal case law on the issue. See, e.g., El Instituto Costarricense 
de Electricidad v. Alcatel-Lucent (S.A.), No. 10-25859 CA 13 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2011) (order), 
discussed in Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969. 
103. See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 665-70 (2013) (discussing the “presumption that [a] state’s statutes accommodate[s] the 
state’s normal choice-of-law rules”). 
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restricted the extent to which federal law applies abroad, it has done so in a way 
that has little relevance to state courts and is thus likely to be of fairly limited 
influence on them. 
IV. CALIFORNIA: AN EXTRATERRITORIALITY TEST CASE 
To consider how state rules and standards may often operate 
extraterritorially, it is worth considering the example of California. California is a 
useful test case both because it is a large state and because its courts hear many 
disputes with foreign elements.104 In choice-of-law cases, California makes use of 
a “comparative impairment” approach,105 a form of governmental interest analysis 
pioneered by William Baxter106 that has attracted both praise and criticism.107 
Engaging in a full comparative impairment analysis is normally a three-step 
process: First, the court determines whether any relevant difference exists in the 
laws of any “potentially affected” jurisdiction.108 Second, if a difference exists, 
the court determines whether each such jurisdiction has any interest in the 
application of its law.109 Finally, if more than one jurisdiction does have such an 
interest, the court must “‘determine which state’s interest would be more 
impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.’”110 
Like many choice-of-law regimes,111 California’s version of governmental 
interest analysis has a built-in forum bias.112 Courts applying California choice-
of-law principles have generally held that forum (i.e., California) law applies as 
the default and that the party advocating for the application of foreign law must 
affirmatively make the case that California law should be displaced.113 Hurtado v. 
 
104. See Jorge A. Vargas, The Emerging Presence of Mexican Law in California Courts, 7 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 215, 217-18 (2005) (noting that California courts decided more than 200 cases involving foreign law 
over a two-year period and suggesting that foreign-law cases will become even more significant part of 
California courts’ docket). 
105. See e.g., McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010). 
106. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963). 
107. For a review of the literature both criticizing and defending comparative impairment, see Lili Levi, 
The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 541 (2012) (acknowledging comparative 
impairment’s critics but suggesting it might be a useful way to think about “libel tourism” cases). Mark Rosen, 
for example, suggests that relying on comparative impairment in the international context is potentially 
problematic because it requires courts to balance incommensurable interests and pronounce on matters that the 
executive and legislative branches are perhaps better suited to assess. Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” 
Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 818-19 (2004). Nonetheless, Rosen concludes that 
these “challenges to international comparative impairment may not be devastating,” because courts in fact have 
shown some competency in addressing similar issues in the domestic context. See id. at 817. 
108. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 107 (2006). 
109. Id. at 107-08. 
110. Id. at 108. 
111. See, e.g., Florey, supra note 5, at 537. 
112. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974). 
113. Id. 
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Superior Court,114 for example, suggests that California law applies unless a party 
“timely invokes the law of a foreign state” and “demonstrate[s] that the latter rule 
of decision will further the interest of the foreign state.”115 The case for foreign 
law rather than California law may fail at any of the three steps described above: 
the court may determine that the content of foreign law does not differ from 
California law,116 that the foreign jurisdiction lacks an interest in applying its 
law,117 or that the foreign jurisdiction’s interest would be less impaired than 
California’s if its policy were “subordinated.”118 
While this general framework applies in both foreign-nation and sister-state 
cases,
119
 the forum bias is, if anything, sometimes accentuated in foreign-nation 
cases. It is reasonable to assume that courts generally have more difficulty 
ascertaining the content or purposes of a foreign nation’s law than they do sister-
state law. Thus, the forum-law default may be more likely to apply in foreign-law 
cases.
120
 In Sommer v. Gabor, for example, a California court upheld the 
application of forum law to a defamation claim arising in Germany.121 The case, 
at first glance, had significant ties to Germany: the plaintiff was a German-born 
actress (Elke Sommer) with a reputation that “crosse[d] the ocean.”122 Sommer 
sued Zsa Zsa Gabor and her husband for allegedly defamatory comments made 
by Gabor in German to a German journalist while Gabor was staying in a 
 
114. Id. 
115. See Hill v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:06-cv-00939-AWI-DLB, 2012 WL 967577, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (“The law of the forum . . . will be displaced only if there is a compelling reason for 
doing so.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 
1992) (“[California] choice of law analysis embodies the presumption that California law applies unless the 
proponent of foreign law can show otherwise”); see Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 514, 
517 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“Under the government interest analysis, California will apply its own law unless it is 
shown that there is a compelling reason to displace forum law.”). Cf. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil 
Co., 22 Cal.3d 157, 163 n.5 (1978) (suggesting that this principle is not interpreted rigidly, and that courts may 
take judicial notice of foreign law). 
116. See, e.g., Rivera v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 217 Cal. App. 3d 294, 298 (1st Dist. 1990) 
(“no true conflict of law” existed where two jurisdiction’s laws were “reasonably identical” and thus California 
law applied as forum law). 
117. See Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court of Orange County, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 920 (2001) 
(the court “may properly find California law applicable without proceeding to the third step in the analysis if the 
foreign law proponent fails . . . establish the other state’s interest in having its own law applied”). 
118. See, e.g., Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 128 (concluding that California 
law should apply to most issues in the case because “the interests of California would be severely impaired if its 
law were not applied in this context, whereas Georgia’s interest would not be significantly impaired if 
California law rather than Georgia law were applied”). 
119. See, e.g., id. at 100 (applying interest analysis/comparative impairment framework to conflict 
between California and Georgia law); Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 579-80 
(1974) (applying similar framework to conflict between law of California and of Mexico). 
120. “This is the case because forum law applies by default unless “the proponent of foreign law can 
show otherwise.” Marsh, 805 F. Supp. at 1496. Such a showing generally involves both establishing a 
difference between foreign law and California law and making the case that any such difference creates an 
interest on the part of the foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 1497. 
121. Sommer v. Gabor, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1455, 1469-70 (2d Dist. 1995). 
122. Id. at 1463. 
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German hotel123 and by Gabor’s husband to a German journalist.124 In both cases, 
the allegedly defamatory remarks had been published in German-language 
publications.125 Nonetheless, in large part because of uncertainty about German 
law’s content, the court found the lower court’s application of California law 
(under which plaintiff had recovered a total of $3.3 million against both 
defendants)126 to be proper. As the court noted, “[t]he snippets and portions of 
German case law cited by appellants are simply not adequate for us to make any 
meaningful conclusions regarding the result of applying German law to the 
instant case,” far less to determine Germany’s interest in applying its law under 
the circumstances.127 Absent such a showing, the court found that forum—i.e., 
California—law should apply under governmental interest analysis.128 
Even where the content of foreign law is clear, courts applying California 
law sometimes take a restrictive view of what counts as an “interest” on the part 
of the foreign jurisdiction. Consider, for example, the case of damages. In a 
variety of cases, courts applying California law have found that non-California 
jurisdictions that limit either compensatory or punitive damages have no interest 
in applying those limits unless the defendant is resident there,129 even when the 
conduct at issue occurred in the foreign jurisdiction.130 
The first two stages, then, tend to have a tilt, either implicit or explicit, in 
favor of forum law. The third stage, in which courts assess which jurisdiction’s 
interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied, is perhaps more of 
an equal contest; California courts have chosen non-California law over forum 
law with some frequency.131 In these cases, however, analysis is sometimes fact-
specific and unpredictable.132 
 
123. Id. at 1461-62. 
124. Id. at 1462-63. 
125. Id. at 1461. 
126. Id. at 1463-64. 
127. Sommer, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 1469.  
128. See id. at 1470; see also Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court of Orange County, 24 Cal. 
4th 906, 919 (2001) (explaining that “the foreign law proponent must identify the applicable rule of law in each 
potentially concerned state and must show it materially differs from the law of California”). 
129. See, e.g., Pecover v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. C 08-2820 VRW, 2010 WL 8742757, at *61 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 21, 2010); see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *8-*9 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 22, 2006); see, e.g., Bauer v. Club Med Sales Inc., No. C-95-1637 MHP, 1996 WL 310076, at *17 
(N.D. Cal. May 22, 1996); see, e.g., Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see, e.g., 
Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 583 (1974). 
130. See, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (noting that conduct at issue occurred primarily within 
Nigerian borders); see, e.g., Bauer, 1996 WL 310076, at *6 (noting that “the acts giving rise to the action 
occurred in a foreign country”). In at least one case, a court applying California choice-of-law principles applied 
the California law of punitive damages notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was a resident of New 
Jersey, which limited damages. See Hill v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:06-cv-00939-AWI-DLB, 2012 
WL 967577, at *0-10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). 
131. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An 
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 607 (1980) (noting that, under comparative 
impairment analysis, California courts applied foreign law rather than California law in three of four prominent 
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The often forum-law-friendly environment of California courts has already 
attracted the notice of foreign plaintiffs, and is likely to do so even more 
frequently in the wake of Morrison and Kiobel.133 An instructive recent case is 
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.,134 a Ninth Circuit case applying California conflicts 
law that has received particular attention in the wake of the Kiobel decision. The 
case alleged that Chevron, acting through a subsidiary, had paid for a “series of 
brutal attacks” on plaintiffs while they were engaged in political protests.135 
Plaintiffs alleged several California tort-law claims.136 To all issues besides the 
plaintiffs’ wrongful-death claim, the court applied California law.137 
The court’s reasons for applying California law were diverse. As to 
plaintiffs’ assault and battery and negligence claims, the court found that 
Nigerian law did not materially differ from California law and thus California 
law applied.138 As to plaintiffs’ survival actions, the court found that while 
Nigeria’s law differed from California’s (Nigeria, unlike California, did not allow 
punitive damages), Nigeria lacked an interest and thus California law applied.139 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the established California choice-
of-law principle that “limitations of liability, as opposed to exposure to tort 
liability, are false conflicts when the defendant is a non-resident corporation.”140 
With respect to the causes of action plaintiffs had stated for intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and civil 
conspiracy, the court found that a material difference existed: California 
recognized these claims, while Nigeria did not.141 Further, the court found this 
difference to create a true conflict in which both jurisdictions had an interest in 
having their law applied.142 But in proceeding to comparative impairment 
analysis, the court found that California’s interest would be the more impaired if 
 
cases). 
132. Many scholars have noted the danger that the somewhat subjective nature of comparative 
impairment analysis will lead to unpredictable results. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 318 (1990) (noting that “actual cases decided under comparative impairment analysis” 
illustrate the fact that it requires judgments that are “too subjective and too complex”). 
133. See generally, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761. 
134. See generally id. 
135. Id. at *1. 
136. Plaintiffs stated claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, civil conspiracy, assault and battery, negligence, and 
survival actions. Id. at *7-9. 
137. See id. Interestingly, the court applied Nigerian law to the wrongful death claim based on earlier 
cases that, relying on American Banana and the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (since abandoned by 
California), suggested that California’s wrongful death statute did not apply outside the state’s borders. See 
Gordon v. Reynolds, 187 Cal. App. 2d 472, 476-77 (1961). 
138. See Bowoto, 2006 WL 245576, at *9. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at *8. 
142. Id. at *9. 
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its law were not applied. California had an interest in regulating the conduct of 
corporations operating within its borders, while Nigeria’s interest in “defining its 
tort law” did not legitimately extend to “depriving plaintiffs of a mechanism to 
recover for allegedly brutal attacks.”143 Thus, even though it was a “close 
question,” California law applied to these claims as well.144 
The case ultimately proceeded to a jury verdict, which Chevron won.145 Thus, 
Chevron was not in the end required to pay damages under California law. 
Nonetheless, Bowoto illustrates both the way in which international human rights 
claims may be reframed in the terms of state tort law (notably, the plaintiffs had 
stated federal claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection 
Act alongside their state-law claims)146 and the more general potential for broad 
applicability of state law to conduct abroad.147 
The experience of California is important because it shows both that 
plaintiffs have often succeeded in bringing claims with substantial forum 
elements in state court and that choice-of-law principles have often dictated the 
applicability of forum law in such circumstances.148 Further, there is reason to 
think that California is more similar to, rather than different from, other states in 
this regard.149 Most state choice-of-law systems, for example, exhibit some 
preference for forum law,150 and in general state conflicts principles, including the 
Second Restatement applied by a large plurality of states,151 do not treat foreign 
and sister-state law differently in conflicts analysis.152 
From a policy standpoint, the potential availability of state-law claims has 
the potential for both good and bad consequences. On the one hand, the possible 
applicability of state law may provide the only available avenue of redress to 
human rights victims, those injured by corporate fraud, and other sympathetic 
plaintiffs. On the other hand, the widespread use of state courts and state law in 
disputes with foreign elements raises legitimate concerns about forum-
shopping,153 difficulty anticipating which sovereign’s standards will govern 
 
143. See id. at *10. 
144. Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761 at *10. 
145. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 
146. See Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761 at *11. 
147. The attacks had been ordered and carried out in Nigeria, although plaintiffs alleged that they had 
been “approved and later ratified in California.” Id. at *10. 
148. Much commentary has focused on potential obstacles plaintiffs face in bringing claims with 
substantial foreign elements in state courts. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 4, at 741-52. The nature and severity 
of obstacles plaintiffs face depends, of course, on what sort of claims they are trying to bring and how 
substantial the foreign elements are. 
149. See Florey, supra note 5, at 537.  
150. Id.  
151. See Symeonides, supra note 78, at 278-79. 
152. See Reimann, supra note 9, at 576-77. 
153. In Morrison, for example, Justice Scalia invoked worries that the United States might become a 
“Shangri-La” for foreign securities plaintiffs. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 
2877-78 (2010). 
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particular conduct,154 and inappropriate projection of state power.155 But 
regardless of where one thinks the balance should be struck, a strong argument 
exists that the issue of state-law applicability to foreign disputes should be made 
part of discussions of both the federal presumption against extraterritoriality and 
to the merits (or lack thereof) of the current state choice-of-law framework when 
applied in the international context. The next section discusses this point in more 
detail.156 
V. THE FUTURE: RECONCILING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY WITH STATE APPROACHES 
A. What the Presumption Means (and Does Not Mean) for States 
The Court’s recent revival of interest in the presumption against 
extraterritoriality offers little to guide states in their choice-of-law decision 
making processes. To begin, the Court’s expansion of the presumption suggests 
that it has abandoned an approach to extraterritoriality grounded in comity and 
international norms in favor of one rooted entirely in statutory interpretation.157 
Whatever might be said for or against this shift more generally, it suggests that 
state courts applying predominantly common law will find little in the Court’s 
recent case law to guide them. 
This is not for lack of interest or concern on the part of state courts, which 
have often earnestly attempted to follow the Court’s extraterritoriality approach 
to the extent that they can.158 But, because of their focus on statutes, Morrison or 
Kiobel shed little light on the question of how far state law should extend when 
no legislative intent exists about which to make presumptions. 
The divergence in the applicability of federal and state law raises a number 
of obvious problems. As a starting point, the potentially greater applicability of 
state (as opposed to federal) law abroad creates a strong likelihood that disputes 
with foreign elements will increasingly be governed by state-law standards, 
whether in state or federal court. Because both state substantive law and state 
choice-of-law principles are quite diverse, this phenomenon in turn increases 
uncertainty about the potential legal consequences of foreign conduct and 
undermines what Anthony Colangelo has called “spatial legality”—the due 
process principle that conduct that is legal in the jurisdiction where it is 
 
154. See Colangelo, supra note 14, at 75 (describing the issue of “retrospective alteration of rules 
subjecting parties to a law they could not have expected would govern their conduct”). 
155. See Florey, supra note 5, at 571. 
156. See infra Part V. 
157. See Knox, supra note 19, at 352. This is true to a great extent even in Kiobel, where the Court raised 
some foreign policy and comity concerns but ultimately treated the question at hand as one largely of statutory 
interpretation. See supra note 98. 
158. See Bernstein et al., supra note 100, at 969. 
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undertaken should not be subject to unforeseeable legal consequences in a distant 
place.159 
In addition to due process concerns, the greater reach of state law raises both 
questions about the inappropriate projection of U.S. power and concerns about 
federalism.160 States currently enjoy nearly unlimited power under the U.S. 
Constitution to apply their law to disputes so long as they have at least a few 
modest connections to the case.161 A state determined to apply its law to a 
predominantly foreign dispute would face few external checks on its doing so.162 
Yet such a result could have potentially serious consequences for U.S. foreign 
relations. State power applied abroad is likely to be seen by other nations as U.S. 
power in a different form, and for that reason the application of state law abroad 
raises (at a minimum) the same concerns as those present where federal law is 
concerned. 
Further, such application of state law may directly interfere with deliberate 
decisions by Congress to exercise restraint in how broadly to apply a parallel 
federal law abroad. For this reason, some scholars have suggested that a 
preemption principle may, in some circumstances, limit the applicability of state 
law abroad.163 Such a principle, however, finds little support in case law164 and 
(particularly where state common law is concerned) is in considerable tension 
with states’ historical freedom to select their preferred conflicts principles 
without federal interference.165 
Finally, a shift in cases with foreign elements from federal court and federal 
law to state court and state law lays bare some of the conceptual limitations of 
state choice-of-law methodology. It is hard to defend an approach that treats 
identically, on the one hand, a major difference in law reflecting serious policy 
divisions between two countries and, on the other, a minor difference in sister-
 
159. See Colangelo, supra note 14, at 72-73. Of course, this concern does not by itself dictate any 
particular interpretation of the territorial scope of state law. It certainly does not mean that such law may never 
apply to conduct or actors outside the borders of the United States. It simply means that, when state law is 
applied extraterritorially, it should be done so in a way that is guided by consistent and relatively predictable 
principles. 
160. See Florey, supra note 5, at 571. 
161. States, that is, are limited in their ability to apply their law to a particular dispute only by the modest 
constraints imposed by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 557. 
162. This is not at all to say that such practices are common; many state courts, indeed, are sensitive to 
concerns about projecting state law into the foreign arena, and make use of many devices (such as forum non 
conveniens and the personal jurisdiction “reasonableness” inquiry) to exercise restraint. See id. at 561. Indeed, 
one could argue that the lack of guidance available to state courts results in a suboptimal degree of application 
of state law to foreign disputes, since state courts in marginal cases may err on the side of restraint. 
163. See Childress, supra note 4, at 749-50 (exploring various preemption theories). 
164. See id. at 749 (“Few decisions have held state laws unconstitutional on the grounds that they impact 
the federal government’s exercise of foreign affairs.”). 
165. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (noting that states may permissibly 
apply a variety of choice-of-law principles and expressing wariness about the “enterprise of constitutionalizing 
choice-of-law rules, with no compass to guide us beyond our own perceptions of what seems desirable”). 
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state laws such as which insurance policies can be used to provide compensation 
for a motorcycle accident.166 To the extent that states wish their choice-of-law 
regimes to be fair, effective, and coherent, they will have to adapt them to this 
new reality.167 
Such adaptation, however, should go beyond simply mimicking recent 
developments in federal extraterritoriality principles. It would be a mistake, that 
is, for state courts to take the restrictive approach to the applicability of U.S. law 
abroad that underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
To begin with, the central justification for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is that it accords with legislative intent. As the Court opined, 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act in Smith v. United States, it believed its result to be the “same conclusion that 
the 79th Congress would have reached had it expressly considered the question 
we now decide.”168 Similarly, the Court’s analysis in Kiobel focused almost 
entirely on events surrounding the passage of the Alien Tort Statute in an attempt 
to discern Congress’s intent as to its territorial reach.169 
To the extent congressional intent is the primary justification for the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, the presumption should not apply to state 
common law. Arguably, it should not apply to state statutory law either. Given 
that states’ economies and overall welfare are highly interconnected, the 
“perception that [the legislature] ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, 
not foreign matters,”170 which underpins the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, is a far less plausible assumption in the state context, at least 
where applicability of state law to sister states is at issue.171 Further, the fact that 
Congress may legislatively override the presumption, and has in fact done so, 
mitigates its strictness in the federal context.172 Though similar overrides by state 
legislatures are of course possible, the sheer scope of state statutory and common 
 
166. This was the question at issue in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305 (1981), one of the 
principal cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed the constitutional limits on state choice-of-law 
decisions. Such differences may, of course, be highly meaningful to the litigants in a particular case, but they 
have few long-term policy implications. Moreover, many such disputes involve national businesses that can 
certainly predict and plan for the fact that they will be likely held to account in multiple states that may apply 
somewhat different legal regimes to them. 
167. Of course, given the controversy that has long attended the development of state choice-of-law 
principles even in the wholly domestic context, however, any such adaptation is likely to be a complex and 
fraught process. 
168. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1993). 
169. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1665-69 (2013).  
170. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
171. Indeed, routine application of state conflicts principles produces results that might be characterized 
as “extraterritorial.” See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1074 (2009). 
Because this effect of choice-of-law decisions is a long-standing one, state legislatures can likely be presumed, 
at least in many circumstances, to have acted against its backdrop. 
172. See Florey, supra note 5, at 550. 
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law makes it unreasonable to think state legislatures could take action to clarify 
the scope of every state legal rule that might conceivably apply outside state 
borders. 
Yet if the presumption against extraterritoriality is likely to be of little use to 
state courts, earlier federal cases that grappled with broader issues of 
extraterritoriality may, by contrast, provide valuable guidance. John Knox has 
identified various presumptions against extrajurisdictionality that federal courts 
historically applied in interpreting the reach of federal law;173 such principles 
seem of equal relevance when applied to state statutes that may be applied 
abroad. Likewise, principles of comity, as articulated in cases like Timberlane 
Lumber, provide an untapped source of guidance for state courts negotiating 
state-law/foreign-law conflicts.174 Reliance on such principles may not, of course, 
be a full solution to the problem, but they could at least provide a starting point 
for the development of a body of doctrine that recognizes the distinct issues 
posed by conflicts between state and foreign-nation law.175 
B. State Conflict Doctrine’s Relevance to the Interpretation of Federal Statutes 
The previous section argued that state courts negotiating state-law/foreign-
law conflicts should take more account of federal precedent.176 While a full 
discussion of the federal presumption against extraterritoriality is beyond the 
scope of this brief Article, it is nonetheless worth noting that the case for 
increased dialogue between federal and state approaches applies to federal law as 
well. In other words, the potential substitution of state law for federal law in 
disputes with foreign elements should also guide federal courts as they apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. 
The phenomenon of state-law replacement of federal law abroad undermines 
to some degree the justifications the Court has articulated for the presumption 
 
173. See Knox, supra note 19, at 362-66. Knox suggests a modern framework rooted in this early case 
law and in current international norms, under which 
If [such norms] allocate the United States sole or primary legislative jurisdiction, then the court 
would have a green light to construe the statute without any presumption against its application. If 
the United States does not have sole or primary jurisdiction, but international law does provide it 
with some basis for jurisdiction, then the light would turn yellow: the court would employ a soft 
presumption against application of the statute that could be overcome by an indication of legislative 
intent that it do so. Finally, if the United States has no basis under international law for jurisdiction, 
the light would be red. 
Id. at 396. Again, this framework is highly adaptable to the state context as well. For a related argument that 
international relations concerns should guide courts in determining whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is triggered in the first instance, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 
WILL. & MARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014). 
174. See Florey, supra note 5, at 575 n.245. 
175. See id.  
176. See supra Part V.A. 
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against extraterritoriality.177 To the extent the presumption is designed to reflect 
real-world congressional intent, it seems improbable that Congress would, in 
general, desire state law to apply abroad to a greater extent than federal law.178 
Likewise, to the extent that the presumption is in part driven by the hope that it 
will foster predictability179 and discourage forum-shopping, courts should 
consider the fact that the potential substitution of state law may make these 
aspirations less likely to be achieved.180 
This tension between the phenomenon of state-law replacement of federal 
law and the stated justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality 
should guide federal courts in applying the latter. To the extent the presumption’s 
primary justification is that it reflects congressional intent, courts should take into 
account the possibility that applying the presumption will result in state law 
being substituted for foreign law and weigh that potential result in their 
consideration of whether the presumption has been overcome.181 To the extent the 
presumption is also justified by the Court’s policy worries,182 the possible 
substitution of state law may also be relevant in ascertaining how broadly the 
presumption should be applied. 
Such effects do not make a comprehensive case against the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, but they do perhaps counsel in favor of greater 
selectivity and nuance in the way in which courts apply the presumption. At the 
 
177. See Florey, supra note 5, at 566.  
178. In other contexts, that is, we generally assume that issues touching upon foreign relations are the 
domain of Congress, not the states. See Childress, supra note 4, at 749-50. We further assume that Congress 
normally legislates because it wants to preempt or supplement state law; it seems reasonable that this intention 
would not be limited to wholly domestic conduct. See Florey, supra note 5, at 566. One could argue that this 
principle does not necessarily undermine the Court’s stated rationale for the presumption—the notion that 
perception that “Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.” See Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2869 (2010). That is, it is completely plausible that, with respect 
to any given piece of legislation, Congress intended that it only apply domestically and gave no consideration to 
its possible overseas application or the possibility that state law might become the governing standard. At the 
same time, a strong argument exists that our more general understanding of what areas Congress legislates in 
(and why it does so) should inform our understanding of whether and how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should be applied. 
179. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (criticizing extraterritoriality regimes not rooted in the presumption 
as “complex in formulation and unpredictable in application”). 
180. See id. at 2886 (noting danger that, without a strict limit on the extraterritorial application of federal 
law, the United States might become “Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those 
allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets”). 
181. The Court has yet to clarify exactly what sort of evidence would suffice to overcome the 
presumption. In Kiobel, however, the Court focused extensively not just on statutory language but on “the 
historical background against which the [Alien Tort Statute] was enacted” to assess whether the presumption 
had been overcome. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013). The Court’s 
lengthy consideration of this issue suggests that the context in which Congress legislates may provide at least 
some evidence of whether the presumption has been overcome. 
182. See Kramer, supra note 132. 
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very least, courts applying the presumption should do so with an understanding 
of the potential state-law replacement effects they may be creating.183 
The substitution of state law for federal law also supports the case for 
congressional action to clarify federal statutes’ extraterritorial reach. Through 
explicit pronouncements, Congress has the power to overcome the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.184 In cases where state law appears likely to apply to 
foreign disputes, there is a particularly strong case for Congress to pass 
legislation that would supply a more uniform federal standard. Such legislation, 
depending on circumstances, might or might not be accompanied by a provision 
explicitly preempting related state causes of action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State and federal approaches to law’s extraterritorial reach have long moved 
along separate tracks, with states dealing with such issues (if at all) within the 
rubric of their existing conflicts principles, while federal law has been subject to 
a distinct body of doctrine regulating its extraterritorial reach.185 The Supreme 
Court’s recent strengthening of the presumption against extraterritoriality has 
only accentuated this divide.186 The Court has moved the doctrine of federal 
extraterritoriality in a direction increasingly incompatible with state approaches, 
while at the same time left a void that state law seems likely to fill at least in 
part.187 This divergence has the potential to undermine predictability for foreign 
actors and to upend the normal state-federal balance of power in matters touching 
on foreign relations.188 This situation in turn calls upon both state and federal 
courts to find ways to understand the interrelationship of state and federal 
approaches and perhaps to reconcile them to some degree. Even as state and 
federal approaches to extraterritoriality are moving in increasingly different 
directions, both might be better served by greater dialogue and, ultimately, 
greater convergence. 
 
 
183. Justice Breyer, indeed, noted this potential in his brief Morrison concurrence, although it is not clear 
if the majority took such issues into account. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(observing that “state law . . . may apply to the fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United 
States”). 
184. See, e.g., supra Part II. 
185. See supra Parts II, III. 
186. See supra Part V.A. 
187. See supra Part V.B. 
188. See supra Part V.B. 
